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Environmental Reform, Negative Duties, and Petrocrats:
A Strategic Green Energy Argument
Shmuel Nili, Yale UniversityThis article constructs an argument for the development of green energy that can appeal to Americans moderately
skeptical of climate change. Accepting—arguendo and in a qualified way—key empirical and normative assumptions of
American environmental skeptics, I make two main moves. First, while environmentalists often justify the development
of green energy through references to future generations, I try to show that they need a present-oriented argument fo-
cused on negative duties to respect rights in order to justify prioritizing the development of green energy to environmen-
tal skeptics in the United States. Second, I construct such an argument, calling on affluent democracies to develop green
energy in order to be able to stop their complicity, through oil trade, in petrocrats’ violation of their peoples’ property
rights. I anticipate multiple objections, including the objection that stopping trade with petrocrats will not lead to green
energy as a replacement.Considered schematically, one can suggest three mainways in which political philosophers might contrib-ute to democratic discussions of public policy. First,
when important moral intuitions about a given public issue
seem to conflict, philosophers can try to provide “guidance
where guidance is needed” (Rawls 1999, 18) by construct-
ing theories that adjudicate among these intuitions or ren-
der them coherent, identifying the resulting policy princi-
ples. Second, philosophers can aid democratic deliberation
by assigning moral priorities among policies that are all
agreed to be required by justice. Third, even where themoral
justification of an important public policy seems over-
determined, and its priority clear, there might sometimes be
legitimate opponents who reject both the prevalent moral
arguments for the policy and its urgency. In this context,
the most distinctive contribution open to philosophers who
support the disputed policy is to reconstruct the opponents’
moral claims in their strongest form and show that even on
these terms, the policy in question is in fact justified and
urgent.
My aim here is to make this last, “strategic” type of phil-
osophical contribution. I seek to do so, specifically, with regard
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sible, the development of clean renewable energy to replace
affluent democracies’ reliance on oil. This is not the only energy
policy demand of the environmental movement (green alter-
natives to coal are at least equally important). But insofar as oil
“still accounts for roughly a third of the primary energy supply
worldwide, and transportation systems everywhere remain over-
whelmingly dependent on petroleum-based fuels” (Florini 2012,
293–94), the development of green alternatives to oil would
clearly constitute a significant environmental achievement. In
turn, the most important critics of policies pursuing such al-
ternatives are environmental skeptics in the United States.
I will accordingly accept—though solely for the sake of dis-
cussion and in a qualified way—key empirical and norma-
tive assumptions associated with American skepticism re-
garding climate change. From this starting point, I will make
two main moves. First, while environmentalists often jus-
tify the development of green energy through moral claims
regarding future generations, I will try to show that they
need a present-oriented strategy focused on negative duties
to respect rights in order to justify prioritizing the devel-
opment of green energy to environmental skeptics in the
United States. Second, accordingly, I will construct an ar-5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/682580
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on duties to respect the property rights of existing persons.
The heart of this argument, to anticipate, will be that af-
fluent democracies must develop green energy in order to
be able to stop their complicity, through oil trade, in petro-
crats’ violation of their peoples’ property rights.
I elaborate this strategic argument as follows. I begin by
providing further background on the kind of argument that
I wish to construct and by explaining (among other things)
why I put aside environmentalist claims regarding the threat
that climate change poses to existing generations (see the first
section, “Environmental Philosophy and Political Engage-
ment”). I proceed to outline the skeptical position within
whose terms the argument will run, and lay out a philo-
sophical version of the skeptical attack on green appeals to
future generations (in the second section, “The Skeptic”). I
then present the strategic argument for the development of
green energy, based on democracies’ duty to prohibit their
corporations from purchasing oil controlled by dictators (in
the third section, “An Alternative Argument for Green En-
ergy”). Finally, I anticipate objections, including the objec-
tion that stopping trade with petrocrats will not lead to green
energy as a replacement (in the fourth section, “From Dic-
tatorial Oil to Green Energy?”).ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT
The arguments to follow assume that philosophical discus-
sions of environmental public policy should be informed by
concrete challenges facing environmentalism as a political
movement. Such an approach aligns with the way at least
some scholars conceive of the purpose of environmental po-
litical theory. “Environmental philosophy,” Avner de-Shalit,
for instance, emphasizes, “is not simply an armchair exercise,
nor is it a discipline of purely academic interest. The goal of
environmental philosophers—interestingly, many of them are
also activists—is to influence policies and change the world
we live in” (de-Shalit 2000, 3). Environmental theorists, David
Schlosberg recently insisted in similar spirit, must connect their
understanding of “environmental or climate justice” to “the
actual demands of social movements that use the idea as an
organising theme or identity” (Schlosberg 2013, 50). An argu-
ment that can push even environmental skeptics to endorse
policies at the heart of the environmentalist agenda comports
well with this practical orientation.
In turn, no practical discussion of environmental skep-
ticism can ignore the distinct significance of the American
context. The United States is of special importance to the
environmentalist cause due to its geopolitical clout, the sheerThis content downloaded from 130.056
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luctance, in comparison to many other liberal democracies,
to pursue environment-friendly policies when these conflict
with other societal goals. This state of affairs is supported
by the world’s most aggressive anti-environmentalist cam-
paigns, most of which are tied to conservative political or-
ganizations, including numerous think tanks (Jacques, Dun-
lap, and Freeman 2008; Oreskes and Conway 2010) and, to
a growing degree, the Republican Party (Dunlap, Xiao, and
McCright 2001; Layzer 2012). These campaigns, in turn, rou-
tinely appeal to normative ideas that are at the heart of
American political culture when seeking public support for
their preferred policies. An argument that consciously begins
from at least some of these ideas—that engages directly with
key elements of the public philosophy of American society—
is therefore especially well suited to confronting environ-
mental skeptics (as much as possible) on their own terms.
In order to engage American anti-environmentalism in
the most fruitful way, I will construct here what I take to be
the strongest possible account of its positions. This account
will be represented in our discussion by the imaginary fig-
ure of “the skeptic.” Though the figure is fictional, it is not
meant to be a caricature. Four features are supposed to guar-
antee this. First, our skeptic will be equipped with a wide
range of arguments, extending beyond the specific domain
of environmental issues to include broader arguments fa-
miliar in American political thought and discourse (espe-
cially from the right wing of American politics). Second,
these arguments will be presented in a way that will make
them as internally coherent as possible. Third, in imagin-
ing the skeptic response to certain green claims, my focus
will be on the strongest and most coherent arguments that
right-wing American skeptics can make that will have some
intuitive moral force rather than on the arguments that right-
wing American skeptics actually make.
Fourth, our skeptic will be moderate, in the following
sense: he will accept that environmental degradation poses
genuine threats and will accordingly recognize that fossil
fuels cannot be relied upon indefinitely. But our skeptic will
nonetheless be much more leisurely about the pace of energy
reform than environmentalists are. The assumption with
which our skeptic will begin is that at some point a shift to
green energy will be necessary, but that this point is much fur-
ther down the line than environmentalists make it seem—
even if, as opposed to what radical skeptics argue, such a
point does exist. This is because, while our skeptic affirms
that global warming is a genuine concern that should be con-
fronted in the long run, he denies that present generations
face grave (let alone existential) risks due to global warm-
ing. Our skeptic thus agrees with Bjørn Lomborg that “global.097.169 on November 08, 2016 17:50:19 PM
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problem. But it is not the end of the world.”1
My attempt to work within these moderately skeptical
terms is bound to trigger several objections. Since these ob-
jections bear in fundamental ways on the entire argument,
I want to anticipate them already at this early stage. First,
some environmentalists might insist that any kind of skep-
ticism regarding the threat posed by climate change, includ-
ing skepticism as to the threat that climate change poses to
present generations, must simply be rejected out of hand
as incompatible with scientific evidence. Therefore, any ap-
proach that seeks to accommodate environmental skepticism
in any way is fundamentally misconceived from the outset.
One response to this objection is the following. Since en-
vironmentalists themselves emphasize how urgent it is to
prioritize the development of green energy, a new argument
that might help win support for such priority is significant,
even if some of those that the argument might convince
hold empirical assumptions regarding climate change that
many environmentalists consider false. If there is potential
convergence on measures that environmentalists themselves
declare to be crucially time sensitive, this should matter in-
dependently of enduring disagreements among supporters of
these measures. It hardly seems sensible, for example, to say
that I should refuse to enlist your support in managing what
I myself declare is a potentially lethal fire, until I make sure
that you support the effort because you agree with me on our
precise reasons for fighting the fire. The same point applies
here. There is value to environmentalist coalition building
that reaches practical agreement on the right course of ac-
tion, even if some parties accept this agreement motivated by
what environmentalists deem to be the wrong reasons.2
Another response to the objection is that it portrays my
argument as more exclusionary than it actually is. I do not
mean to suggest that environmentalists need to forget the
facts of climate change, or forget their broader value sys-
tem, when making policy arguments in the American con-
text. Nothing in the argument I will present here goes against
environmentalists continuing to emphasize the scientific con-
sensus on the facts of climate change, for example, or even,
more specifically, emphasizing the threat that climate change1. Quote from Sophie Elmhirst, “The NS Interview: Bjørn Lomborg,” New
Statesman, September 24, 2010, http://www.newstatesman.com/environment
/2010/09/interview-gay-climate.
2. I am grateful to Simon Caney for this formulation. A remarkable ex-
ample of such environmentalist coalition building is the Green Tea Party, a
coalition for solar energy between environmentalists and Tea Party members
who see solar energy as a response to state energy monopolies. See Carolyn
Kormann, “Greening the Tea Party,” New Yorker, February 17, 2015, at http://
www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/green-tea-party-solar.
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ditional argument, which might generate support for green
energy policies among some who have been at least some-
what unmoved by environmentalists’ factual claims.
My last response to the objection is similarly practical. It
is important to bear in mind that, even after decades of en-
vironmentalists emphasizing the scientific consensus regard-
ing the facts of climate change, a sizeable portion of US pub-
lic opinion—albeit to varying degrees—believes that climate
change is less urgent of a concern than environmentalists
argue (Leiserowitz and Smith 2012). Exactly because time is
of the essence, I am suggesting that environmentalists take
seriously this enduring state of US public opinion not only
by trying to alter it but also by trying to show that even prem-
ises closer to those of their opponents can lead to the pol-
icies that environmentalists themselves deem urgent.
Now, some environmentalists might grant that there could
in principle be value in addressing American environmental
skeptics on their own terms but insist that there is nonetheless
a serious concern about the kind of argument I wish to make.
The concern is that even moderately skeptical premises will
never suffice to convince radical anti-environmentalists who
completely deny the reality of climate change and who are the
real opponents of the environmentalist movement, especially
in the United States.
This objection would only work if US public opinion on
environmental issues was far more binary than it actually
is. It is simply not the case that there exists only a straight-
forward dichotomy with regard to environmental issues, fea-
turing environmentalists on one side and radical climate
change deniers on the other. It is far more plausible to un-
derstand US public opinion on the environment as a scalar
matter—as featuring many different points on a very wide
spectrum. Radical denial of any large-scale environmental
threats is merely one point on this spectrum, even if such
radicals are particularly vocal (partly for the reasons noted
above). Furthermore, while environmentalists may not have
any possibility of convincing radical skeptics, and may just
have to hope to outvote them, one useful way to try to achieve
this is to devise new arguments that can appeal to moderate
skeptics: to those who, while not committing themselves to
extreme views, are attentive to extreme skeptics, and empa-
thize with (at least some of ) the normative claims associated
with extreme skeptics.
In order to provide some empirical backing to these claims,
and in order to see that moderate environmental skepticism
is far from uncommon, it will be helpful to consider the most
comprehensive project examining US public opinion regard-
ing climate change. This is the “Six Americas” project, which
distinguishes among six different segments of Americans.097.169 on November 08, 2016 17:50:19 PM
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“Alarmed,” “Concerned,” “Cautious,” “Disengaged,” “Doubt-
ful,” and, only at the very anti-environmentalist extreme, “Dis-
missive”). According to the project’s latest report, detailing
survey findings from October 2014, the largest segment,
which includes (at 31%) almost a third of American adults,
is that of the Concerned, who “tend to view global warming
as a threat to other nations and future generations, but not
as a personal threat or a threat to their community” (Roser-
Renouf et al. 2015, 7; italics mine). The second-largest seg-
ment (23%) is that of the Cautious, who are “less worried
than the Concerned,” and who think of global warming as
a “distant threat” (Roser-Renouf et al. 2015, 7).3 Moreover,
while the Concerned and the Cautious “range in certainty
about the reality and dangers of climate change, they are
similarly inclined to believe it is a real threat that should
be addressed” (Roser-Renouf et al. 2015, 7; italics mine). If
we combine the two groups, then we find that 54% of Amer-
ican adults hold positions on climate change that at least
roughly correspond to those of the “moderate skeptic” I have
sketched.4 Therefore, even if the figure of the moderate skep-
tic is not meant to be a precise reflection of current public
opinion in the United States, it would be a mistake to dis-
miss it as entirely detached from any actual public sentiment.
There is, however, an important sense in which I will
indeed be keeping my argument detached from political re-
alities. Despite its pragmatic, real-world spirit, the position I
will advance here will have a distinctly philosophical form.
Thus, for example, as will quickly become obvious, I will give
a central place to certain philosophical ideas (among other
things, concerning the nature of rights and duties, and the
moral status of future persons) that are far more abstract and
complex than those that typically dominate real-life political
debates. This gap between political philosophy and political
practice is likely to trigger a final fundamental worry about
my approach: that, for all of its practical framing, it is far too
academic to resonate in actual political discourse.
To prevent misunderstanding, let me stress that I do
not entertain the illusion that the philosophical claims I3. The Concerned and the Cautious are significantly larger than the
group most anxious about environmental threats (the Alarmed, who
amount to 13% of the respondents). But the Concerned and the Cautious
are also significantly larger than the group of the most radical environ-
mental skeptics (the Dismissive, who, like the Alarmed, account for 13%,
and who are “very certain that global warming is not occurring”).
4. The same two groups also accounted for 54% in the “Six Americas”
survey of September 2012 (when the Concerned accounted for 29%, and
the Cautious for 25%). See Leiserowitz et al. (2013, 5). More generally, in
10 of the 11 national surveys that have been tracking the Six Americas
since 2008, the Concerned have been the largest segment of the six. See
Roser-Renouf et al. (2015, 7).
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like an easy—let alone immediate—manner. But I nonethe-
less believe that there is value in asking how political debates
would look if the proponents of the different value systems
that actually clash in the public sphere made more room for
the kind of foundational normative thinking and coherent ar-
gumentation that political philosophers seek.
Furthermore, it is also my belief that insofar as academics
can and should strive to make distinctive contributions to-
ward addressing actual societal issues, much of this contri-
bution lies precisely in constructing tighter and more coher-
ent arguments than the political arena often displays. This
point, it is worth noting, obtains not only for philosophers.
It also obtains for legal scholars, who seek, for example, to
provide theoretical accounts of the law’s internal coherence,
even while recognizing the degree to which real-world law
is shaped by “messy” politics. And the same point similarly
obtains for social scientists, who often construct complex
theoretical models, both explanatory and prescriptive, not-
withstanding their knowledge that real-world political deci-
sions and situations inevitably deviate from their models in
numerous ways. If academics were to forsake the pursuit of
theoretical coherence or rigor because political practice is
often too incoherent or simplistic, this would mean giving up
on any added value that academics can bring to public de-
bate. It would also require assuming that the quality of pub-
lic debates can never improve. But this, it seems to me, is an
undemocratic assumption that all academics ought to avoid.
With these points in mind, we can turn to examine in
greater detail the moderately skeptical position within whose
terms my argument will run. I will start with a list of its basic
elements and then show how they can be tied together as
a coherent whole to oppose familiar environmentalist argu-
ments for the development of green energy.
“THE SKEPTIC”
Foundations of the skeptic position
in American political culture
I will attribute to our moderate skeptic a cluster of ideas
prominent in American political culture. Perhaps the most
foundational of these ideas is the primacy of rights, which
has three main implications. First, agents’ rights are nor-
mally assumed to trump utilitarian calculations of other
agents’ welfare. Second, the emphasis of public policy and
legislation is on negative duties not to violate the immuni-
ties that rights provide. Third, related, the primary (if not
only) kind of moral duties that public policy and legislation
should be based on are duties that correspond to rights. This
means, for one thing, that positive duties to help, as distinct
from negative duties to refrain from violating rights, are rel-.097.169 on November 08, 2016 17:50:19 PM
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Americanmoral and legal tradition,” as Thomas Pogge writes,
denies “that persons have duties to protect and aid other
persons in distress” (Pogge 1989, 34). While there may be a
governmental duty to aid individuals whose very survival is
at stake, any broader positive duties to aid are often seen as
only supererogatory, and their enforcement through law is
cast as illegitimate, among other things, since such enforce-
ment itself violates agents’ rights.5 Furthermore, public pol-
icy and law should focus on ensuring that agents respect
the rights of others. Moral demands that arise from sup-
posed duties that agents have toward themselves—to culti-
vate themselves, to develop certain sensibilities or virtues—
cannot be incorporated into law without triggering firmly
entrenched fears of paternalism, as well as accusations of vi-
olating the state’s moral duty not to endorse specific con-
ceptions of what amounts to a good life.6
Alongside these claims, American political culture is dom-
inated by Lockean ideas concerning property, prosperity, and
innovation.7 Property rights have a pivotal place in the list of
rights that public law and policy should protect. In turn,
agents’ freedom to exercise their property rights is seen as
the key driver of society’s economic prosperity, while gov-
ernment regulation is deemed as almost always a threat to
both this freedom and prosperity. Because of its significance,
attention is constantly given to any (perceived or real) trade-
offs between economic prosperity and other public goods:
noneconomic public goods that are seen as undermining
economic growth are unlikely to gain policy precedence. Fi-
nally, American public culture emphasizes human capacity
for transforming nature into prosperity through skill, labor,
and innovation. This emphasis generates a particularly pro-
nounced optimism regarding the ability of human technology
to overcome natural predicaments.
Let us now see how the ideas of the last two paragraphs,
combined with the moderate empirical skepticism noted
above, translate into a rejection of the environmentalist de-5. This point finds expression even in American popular comedy. The
final episode of the famous Seinfeld sitcom, for instance, features Seinfeld’s
lawyer stunned to hear about a new “Good Samaritan law,” responding:
“Good Samaritan Law? Never heard of it. You don’t have to help anybody.
That’s what this country’s all about.” See http://www.seinfeldscripts.com
/TheFinale.htm.
6. It is worth emphasizing that this is not a fringe intuition character-
izing only extreme libertarian views. To give only one well-known exam-
ple from American philosophy: Rawls’s famous insistence on the “inviola-
bility” of the person who spends his days “counting the blades of grass”
(Rawls 1999, 3, 379) reflects a rejection of paternalism that is just as tren-
chant as the one expressed by Rawls’s libertarian critics.
7. For a contemporary statement of these ideas, see Zuckert (2002).
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icy priority.
The skeptical critique
Because our moderate skeptic rejects empirical green argu-
ments referring to environmental calamities facing present
generations, I focus on future-oriented environmentalist ar-
guments and on how our skeptic might respond to such ar-
guments. What moral arguments can our skeptic make in re-
sponse to moral appeals to future generations? The skeptic
can start by attacking all future-oriented arguments that ap-
peal to moral considerations other than those associated with
negative duties not to violate rights. Here we can imagine
the skeptic saying the following: “Environmentalists can talk
about intuitive sensibilities towards future generations, and
can chastise contemporary-centric arrogance; they can con-
tend that existing lives will be more fulfilling if future gen-
erations are kept in mind, and they can seek to extend the
cognitive and emotional time-horizon of individual lives. But
a public policy based on such arguments would be paternal-
istic (because it would impose policies on citizens ‘for their
own good’) and would violate the state’s duty to remain neu-
tral among different conceptions of the good life (by impos-
ing on some citizens others’ conceptions of what gives value
to life). Therefore, all of these arguments can at most serve
as guides for the behavior of individuals or voluntary civil
society groups. As long as they do not convincingly appeal to
negative duties not to harm future generations, none of these
arguments can be used to justify public policies that shift re-
sources to future generations at the expense of current gen-
erations.”
Having narrowed the discussion to negative duties toward
future generations, the skeptic might highlight the difficul-
ties in establishing that present generations are violating such
negative duties—are harming future generations in morally
significant ways. Suppose for the moment that the skeptic
accepts a comparative notion of “harm,” according to which
setting back agents’ important interests counts as illegiti-
mately harming them. Under this notion, the skeptic can
present two arguments against the environmentalist charge
of “harming” future generations.
First, the skeptic will argue that present generations suf-
fer from serious epistemic problems regarding the interests
of future generations. This is not only because present gen-
erations cannot know what the exact interests of future gen-
erations will be. It is also because present generations cannot
know what trade-offs between what interests future gener-
ations will be forced to make. Since it is extremely hard to
know what future generations may have to give up for the
sake of environmental goals, it is difficult to say with any.097.169 on November 08, 2016 17:50:19 PM
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overall interest. Present generations cannot even fully know
(or conceptualize) the parameters or dimensions of these trade-
offs. “Would we expect the generations of the eighteenth cen-
tury,” the skeptic would say, “to make sense of the dilemmas
of the twentieth century between development and conser-
vation? And if not, why should we be confident of our ability
to make sense of the dilemmas and trade-offs of (say) the
twenty-third century?”
Second, the skeptic will continue, even if we assume that
the shape of future trade-offs can be sufficiently clear to pre-
sent generations, this still does not mean that present gen-
erations have a duty to adopt policies that favor the environ-
mental side of the trade-off, nor does this mean that present
generations will be harming future generations by failing to
make the environmental choices for them. After all, it might
very well be that future generations will themselves prefer the
nonenvironmental side of these trade-offs, in much the same
way, for example, that many developing countries are cur-
rently prioritizing economic growth over environmental goals.
The skeptic can make both of these arguments even if he
accepts the assumption that setting back others’ important
interests necessarily means violating a negative duty not to
harm them. But the skeptic is in fact likely to reject even this
assumption. He might say the following: “We do not in fact
think that setting back people’s important interests necessar-
ily means violating a negative duty not to harm them. For
instance, Jane might make Jack significantly worse off by driv-
ing him out of business through legitimate competition, but
that in itself does not necessarily mean that Jane illegitimately
harmed Jack. Similarly, even if it could somehow be established
that present generations are setting back important interests
of future generations by avoiding more environment-friendly
policies, this does not by itself mean that present generations
are violating a negative duty not to harm future generations.”
Arguably the only thing that would convince the skeptic
that present generations are violating negative duties toward
future generations is an argument showing that the former
are violating the latter’s rights in some reasonably clear way.
But here all that the skeptic has to do is to point out the
various works in which philosophers have argued that even
if present generations have duties toward future generations,
these duties cannot stem from any rights of future genera-
tions. Indeed, despite valiant efforts from multiple directions,
it remains difficult to defeat the claim that future persons are
merely “possible persons” (Macklin 1981, 152) who cannot
have any rights in the present. Even if one concedes that the
existence of future persons is “virtually certain” (Feinberg 1981,
147), it is hard to entirely defeat the intuition—to which the
skeptic is bound to cling as forcefully as possible—that “whenThis content downloaded from 130.056
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rights” (Gosseries 2008, 456).
The difficulties involved in ascribing rights to future per-
sons have triggered the rise of an explicitly “concessional view”
(Elliot 1989, 162), seeking to argue for future-based duties
even without an appeal to any supposed present rights of fu-
ture persons. But from the perspective of our skeptic, to argue
for duties toward future persons that amount to “more than
they have a right to” (Meyer 1997) is already to argue for the
kind of duties that can at most guide only supererogatory pri-
vate action, not public policy.
If environmentalists wish to retain their focus on the
needs of future generations, but also to argue strategically,
from premises closer to those of their critics, then it seems
that at this point there is only onemore claim to which environ-
mentalists might appeal. Environmentalists might contend
that if present generations do not pursue green policies—chief
among them the development of clean renewable energy—
this will threaten the very survival of future generations. Such
a claim could invoke a Lockean proviso stipulating a right
to basic subsistence, or even simply a very minimal positive
duty to help others survive.
The chief problem with an appeal to the very survival
of future generations, however, is that it invites even the
moderate critic to accuse environmentalists of excessive pes-
simism. Our moderate skeptic can be expected to say some-
thing like the following: “To be sure, we will need to do so
something about the environment eventually. But to pro-
phesize that environmental degradation will very soon threaten
human survival on a massive scale is nonetheless too apoca-
lyptic. Even if such a claim could be proven (which is doubtful)
it in effect holds technology constant, and thus—crucially—
ignores human capacity for innovation. Doomsday predic-
tions regarding humanity’s inability to tend to its basic needs
are nothing new, and these predications have been repeatedly
shown wrong by technological progress.”
The skeptic will not find it too hard to come up with
evocative examples, either. For instance, it is all too conve-
nient to associate environmentalist alarmism about future
survival with past Malthusian fears that have been vastly—
and with hindsight, easily—disproved by technology. In 1798,
the skeptic will remind his opponents, Thomas Malthus de-
clared, “The power of population is indefinitely greater than
the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man” (Mal-
thus 2008, 13). Yet only 150 years after Malthus, the sole
threat to humanity’s survival was to be found in weapons of
its own making. And today, the power of technology to
produce food is indefinitely greater than the “power” of pop-
ulation growth (see, e.g., Cohen 2010, 18). Holding technol-
ogy constant, the skeptic will say, yields mistaken predic-.097.169 on November 08, 2016 17:50:19 PM
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predictions with regard to subsistence.
We can now close this section, with the following interim
conclusion. As long as environmentalists retain their focus on
future generations, they cannot prove, on our skeptic’s terms,
that the development of green energy is crucial. Insofar as
environmentalists have reason to value such a strategic argu-
ment, they need to find alternative ways to make it. Specifi-
cally, environmentalists need a present-oriented argument fo-
cused on negative duties to respect rights, which emphasizes
technological optimism. If this argument can focus on nega-
tive duties to respect present rights central to American skep-
tics, this would be even better. The argument to which I now
turn aims to provide all of these things.8. Pogge (2001); Wenar (2008, 2011). See also Nili (2011b, 2011c).
9. Wenar (2008, 10) might be somewhat oversimplifying, but he none-
theless captures an important point when noting that “the idea that the
natural resources of a country belong to the people of that country is so
intuitive that most will need no more proof than its statement.” Barring
anarchist views, I believe this idea can be defended from the perspective
of most if not all familiar theories of property rights, including even many
cosmopolitan theories. But showing this will take me too far afield.
10. For an emphasis on this analogy, see Pogge (2005, 737) and Wenar
(2008, 17–19).AN ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT FOR GREEN ENERGY:
THE PROBLEM OF TRADE WITH PETROCRATS
The alternative justification for green energy policies that
I wish to elaborate here starts with a simple thought: neg-
ative duties, the kind of duties that our skeptic cherishes,
travel in space much more easily than they travel in time. Our
skeptic may devise multiple arguments for why negative dut-
ies toward noncontemporaries are neither as clear nor as
forceful as negative duties toward contemporaries. But, even
if negative duties are indeed diluted by temporal distance,
they are not diluted by spatial distance—nor, for that matter,
by “distances” of identity or citizenship. Whatever concep-
tual problems wemay face in asserting negative duties toward
noncontemporaries, we face no such difficulties in assert-
ing negative duties toward contemporaries who are non-
compatriots. There is no spatial gradient for our duties not to
violate rights. As Pogge writes, “The moral reasons to refrain
from drunk driving do not become much weaker when we
are briefly working in India or holidaying in Indonesia. They
remain strong when those one is putting in jeopardy are not
neighbors or compatriots but people with a different lan-
guage, culture, religion, latitude or nationality” (Pogge 2010,
212). Now, if environmentalists can identify ongoing vio-
lations of global negative duties toward contemporaries that
trigger a need for affluent democracies to develop green en-
ergy, this will have strategic value in debating American skep-
tics on their own terms. Such strategic value will be particu-
larly pronounced, if the relevant violations refer to rights that
American skeptics themselves prioritize. I wish to suggest that
there is at least one ongoing type of rights violations that fits
this description: the massive-scale violations of national prop-
erty rights that occur when affluent democracies allow cor-
porations based in their territories to purchase oil controlled
by dictators.This content downloaded from 130.056
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms The normative argument for why such purchases should
be considered violations of national property rights has be-
come familiar over the last decade, but it is nonetheless
worth repeating here.8 The argument begins from two basic
premises. The first premise is that state-owned natural re-
sources, like all state property, belong to the people as a
collective agent rather than to the individuals wielding ef-
fective political power.9 The second premise is that mean-
ingful ownership over a resource requires the ability to con-
trol the resource. Therefore, in order for their property rights
over state resources to be respected, peoples as collective agents
need to be able to control these resources. Accordingly, if they
are to respect their people’s ownership of state resources, in-
dividuals who wield effective political power, and who sell state
resources in their people’s name, must claim proper authori-
zation from the people to engage in such sales. But regimes
that rely on bullets rather than ballots to secure political power
cannot claim the requisite authorization. Such regimes often
sell state-owned natural resources without allowing their peo-
ple to know about these sales; rarely, if ever, allow their people
to protest natural resource sales; and never allow the people to
control the resulting revenue through elected delegates. Such
regimes can therefore be said to be systematically violating
their people’s property rights.
In turn, prospective purchasers of state-owned natural re-
sources who know that such violations are taking place ought
not transact with the regimes committing these violations. Just
as individuals have a duty not to buy property that they know
the vendor has illicitly seized from the real owner (person A
ought not buy from B what she knows that B has illicitly
seized from the real owner C), corporations have a duty not
to buy (national) natural resources that they know certain re-
gimes have come to control in illicit ways.10
Different political philosophers elaborating this argument
have offered different accounts as to which regimes should
be considered violators of their peoples’ property rights, and
thus as illegitimate vendors of natural resources. I believe the
most convincing account is one that sees only and all dic-
tatorships as violators of their people’s property rights. For
the purposes of this account, “dictatorships” are defined as.097.169 on November 08, 2016 17:50:19 PM
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law binding upon those wielding effective political power.11
In the absence of free and fair elections, dictators cannot
claim proper authorization from the people to manage the
people’s natural resources. In the absence of a rule of law,
dictators cannot be formally and legally accountable to the
people as the owner of national property—there is no mech-
anism to sanction dictators who abuse their control over this
property.12
It is important, for reasons that will become clear shortly,
to further specify the scope of this argument—the kinds of
regimes whose natural resource exports ought to be seen as il-
legitimate. On the one hand, orienting the argument toward
all and only dictatorships means putting outside its scope
those regimes that can be considered flawed democracies: re-
gimes that clearly take free and fair elections and the rule of
law seriously, even if imperfectly, should be considered legit-
imate vendors of their people’s natural resources.13 On the
other hand, the category of “only and all dictatorships” in-
cludes within the argument’s scope both dictatorships that
deprive their peoples of almost all natural resource revenues
and those dictatorships that distribute much of this revenue
to the people in the form of public spending. Both “distribu-
tive” and “depriving” dictatorships are to be considered vi-
olators of their people’s property rights, and their natural re-
source exports should accordingly be deemed illegitimate.14
Once the argument extends to cover distributive dicta-
torships as well depriving ones, it can make an extremely
significant—even if indirect—contribution to environmental-
ists’ policy agenda. This is because, once applied to all dic-11. For the intimate connection between free and fair elections and
rule of law, see Maravall and Przeworski (2003).
12. For an emphasis on how control of state property requires dem-
ocratic procedures and cannot be satisfied even by “decent hierarchies,”
see Nili (2013a, 488–92).
13. Turkey, at least during decades of explicit military involvement in
politics accompanying elections, can be seen as one example of a flawed
democracy. More importantly, in terms of oil-rich countries, Venezuela, at
least after Chavez, may be considered another example of a flawed de-
mocracy. There are obviously different ways of distinguishing among re-
gime types, and I recognize that some political scientists might be skeptical
of a sharp distinction between democracy and dictatorship. Yet we can put
such potential disagreements aside here, insofar as most if not all of the
regimes I will discuss (especially Russia and Saudi Arabia) will be ones
where the label “dictatorship” can be applied without much controversy.
For a general discussion of extensions to the democracy dictatorship dis-
tinction, see Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010).
14. At least as a matter of principle. The principle can be outweighed
where is a credible threat that ending customary trade will yield absolute
deprivation, but I am assuming that in affluent dictatorships such as Saudi
Arabia, and even in countries such as Russia, this threat is extremely
limited. For extended background on this assumption, see Nili, “A Theory
of Global Injustice” (2015).
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of affluent democracies’ sizeable oil imports. And this fact, in
turn, connects in two ways to green policies.
First, there is the theoretical possibility that affluent de-
mocracies will pursue policies to reduce their energy con-
sumption, so as to offset the “lost” oil supplies that they will
now prohibit their corporations from purchasing. Such a
scenario will obviously be extremely positive from an envi-
ronmentalist perspective (seeWenar 2008, 30). But given just
how dramatic the reduction in energy consumption would
have to be, and given the repercussions this would have for
economic activity, our skeptic, attached as he is to continu-
ous economic growth and prosperity, is much more likely
to prefer the second option: prioritizing the development of
green alternatives to oil that will make it possible for affluent
democracies to reform customary oil trade while retaining
current levels of energy consumption.15
I will spend the remainder of this article on further de-
veloping this latter option by anticipating likely objections.
Before doing so, however, I wish to reiterate how the con-
nection between green energy and the duty to reform cus-
tomary oil trade is strategically useful for environmentalists
who wish to justify the prioritization of green energy de-
velopment even to moderate environmental skeptics.
These strategic green advantages arise, first and foremost,
from the argument’s emphasis on a negative duty to respect
property rights. Admittedly, the property rights invoked here
refer to a people’s ownership over state property rather than
to individual property. But, notwithstanding possible im-
pressions to the contrary, there is no reason why this should
matter in the context of our discussion. Indeed, to explicitly
return the focus to the United States, as a matter of historical
fact, it is clear that some of its most anti-environmentalist
leaders, including those who have sought to minimize the
role of state ownership and regulation in the economy, have
clearly taken seriously the property rights invoked here. As
Leif Wenar notes, when the Reagan administration, for in-
stance, sold to Shell the rights to oil deposits off the coasts of
Louisiana and Florida, these deposits may have become pri-
vate property, but the revenue from the sale clearly belonged
to the American people rather than to the president per-
sonally: “one can imagine the response had President Reagan
secretly sold this oil to Shell, then put the profits from these
sales into his private bank account and ordered the FBI to
detect and squash any dissent” (Wenar 2008, 10). Similarly,
when President George W. Bush, for example, discussed Iraqi15. It should also be added that any elected government that imposed
such a dramatic reduction of energy consumption, with the attendant eco-
nomic consequences, can expect to be voted out of office.
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tion of any private appropriation of this oil preceding its own-
ership by the people. “The oil,” the president declared, “belongs
to the Iraqi people. It’s their asset.”16
The other strategic advantage of arguing from reform of
customary oil trade to green energy is avoiding the marking
of environmentalists as technophobes who underestimate
technology’s ability to better human life and solve societal
problems. In highlighting this point, I do not mean to portray
environmentalists in general as having an antitechnological
orientation. I only wish to emphasize the contrast between an
environmentalist position that is forced—even if only through
external criticism—to identify itself with bleak predictions
holding technologyconstant (asnotedabove), andontheother
hand a position that places environmentalists as believers in
what technology can achieve—specifically, in technology’s abil-
ity to devise green solutions that will disentangle affluent de-
mocracies from their oil dependence.
FROM DICTATORIAL OIL TO GREEN ENERGY?
Let us now turn to possible objections. The first possi-
ble objection that I wish to address comes from those who
might be suspicious of the empirical basis of my argument.
Some may think that affluent democracies’ dependency on
oil controlled by dictators is not significant to such a degree
that a decision to stop recognizing dictators as legitimate ven-
dors of their peoples’ oil will necessitate wide-scale shifts in
energy policy.
This objection is inaccurate. To see why, we can start
with the example of the United States. In 2012, for instance,
according to theUS Energy InformationAdministration (EIA),
the distributive dictatorships of the Persian Gulf alone—Bah-
rain, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and, most impor-
tantly, Saudi Arabia—accounted together for more than a
quarter of US oil imports (which in turn accounted for two
fifths of US oil consumption). Putin’s dictatorship in Russia
provided another five percent of US oil imports. We thus
reach more than thirty percent of US oil imports even before
examining many other dictatorships that, while individually
accounting for only a fraction of US oil imports in a given
year, ultimately add up. The EIA reported that Angola, for
example, accounted for about two and a half percent of US
oil imports; Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ga-16. “President’s Statement to the Press,” June 12, 2006, http://www
.gpogov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2006-book1/html/PPP-2006-book1-doc-pg1117.htm.
Quoted also in Wenar (2008, 10). A more abstract way of making the point
would be to say that the issue of state property illustrates the key differences
between Lockean political philosophy and libertarian-anarchist philosophy.
For a similar emphasis on the distinction between Lockean minimal govern-
ment and libertarian no-government, see Zuckert (2002, chap. 13).
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percent. The dictatorships mentioned in this paragraph alone
thus made up more than a third of US oil imports for 2012—
about twelve hundred million oil barrels.17
The situation of the European Union (EU) in the same
year was even worse. Importing roughly the same amount
of oil as the United States, EU member states imported more
than thirty percent of their oil from Russia; more than nine
percent from Saudi Arabia; almost nine percent from Azer-
baijan and Kazakhstan; and about six percent from Algeria,
Cameroon, Congo, Angola, and Gabon. These dictatorships
accounted for more than half of the EU’s oil imports for
2012—more than two billion oil barrels. Even before we get
to democracies other than the United States and the EU
countries, we can see that democracies remain heavily de-
pendent on oil controlled by dictators.18
Examining these figures, some critics might raise the fol-
lowing, normative objection. The argument’s practical impact
hinges on the claim that democracies ought to boycott the
natural resource exports of distributive dictatorships, most im-
portantly, Saudi Arabia and Russia. However, the normative
grounding of such a boycott is not strong enough when it
comes to distributive dictatorships. It makes sense to boycott
the natural resource exports of a petrocrat who uses the state’s
oil revenue to buy multiple personal jets while raw sewage runs
through the capital’s streets and the majority of the people
are chronically malnourished (as in Equatorial Guinea; Wenar
2008, 6–7). Yet violations of national property rights are far
less alarming in a dictatorship that distributes benefits from oil
revenues to its people. As long as significant benefits are flow-
ing to the population, the mere fact that the regime is depriv-
ing its people of control over national oil is not sufficiently
disturbing to warrant the dramatic step of boycotting the
regime’s natural resource exports.
However intuitive it may seem, this objection is no more
successful than its predecessor, for at least four reasons. First,
in focusing so strongly on the benefits from national prop-
erty, the objection unduly marginalizes the independent nor-
mative weight of owners’ ability to control their property.19
If, for instance, the mafia violently seizes effective control of
a business without the valid consent of its owner, the possi-17. See the EIA’s “U.S. Imports by Country of Origin,” www.eia.gov
/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_a.htm, and “How
Dependent Are We on Foreign Oil?,” http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief
/article/foreign_oil_dependence.cfm.
18. See European Commission, “Monthly and Cumulated Crude Oil
Imports (volumes and prices) by EU and Non EU Country,” http://ec
.europa.eu/energy/observatory/oil/import_export_en.htm (file titled “eu-coi
-from-extra-eu-2012–01–12”).
19. This point follows Nili (2011a, 103–24).
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21. Emphasized, for instance, in Ross (2012).
22. See “The Long Day Closes,” Economist, June 23, 2012, http://
www.economist.com/node/21557327.
23. Nor do I mean to deny that trade with distributive dictatorships can
trigger distinct questions. Thus, for instance, we can ask whether even peoples
who do see themselves as victims of distributive dictatorships might consent to
democracies continuing trade with these dictatorships out of fear of a boycott’s
economic consequences. I do not have the space to pursue this intricate question
here. I will, however, notemy belief that it ultimately does not remove themoral
Volume 77 Number 4 October 2015 / 923bility that the mafia also directs revenues from the business to
the owner does not change its fundamental violation of the
owner’s property rights. More generally, one cannot take the
very idea of property seriously, unless one takes seriously
agents’ right to control their property, independently of where
the benefits that might be derived from the property go.
Second, related, in marginalizing the independent moral
significance of owners’ ability to control their property, the
objection adopts a paternalistic stance that is not only alien
to the normal understanding of property in general but is
also, more specifically, alien to the antipaternalist normative
framework we are presupposing here. The objection amounts
to the claim that depriving agents of control over their prop-
erty is not much of a moral problem as long as this is done in
ways that might be commensurate with their interests. But
this claim is diametrically opposed to the way in which anti-
paternalist views—in the United States in particular—of-
ten understand the significance and grounds of property
rights. In the antipaternalist picture, the deep moral signif-
icance of property rights derives from the fact that they al-
locate to agents a crucial sphere of freedom to make their
own choices, even when agents’ choices might come at the
expense of their own interests. This antipaternalism is evi-
dent in calls—familiar especially from the right wing of Amer-
ican politics—to allow individuals the “freedom to fail” with
the choices they make regarding their property. And the same
antipaternalism is essential to the familiar opposition to var-
ious government measures that limit agents’ control over their
property “for their own good.” From an antipaternalist per-
spective in particular, then, it makes little sense to focus on
benefits from property and to marginalize the significance of
agents’ ability to control their property.
Third, again related, if all that mattered with regard to a
people’s property was that the people enjoyed enough of
the revenue from this property, regardless of who controlled
it, then it is unclear how we could explain our intuitive ob-
jection to paternalistic colonial control of national property.20
After all, colonial masters could be just as “benign” as local
dictators have been in distributing to the ruled material bene-
fits from the resources they seized. But hardly anyone would
accept such distribution as permitting the violent colonial
seizing of the resources of other peoples. Why should the
case be different when the perpetrators are not colonial for-
eigners but rather local presidents, juntas, or royals?
Finally, the objection is also problematic in suggesting
an overly rosy picture of how distributive dictatorships man-
age the benefits from their people’s oil. There are strong rea-20. On this point, I follow Wenar (forthcoming).
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torships that channel a relatively stable and significant por-
tion of the country’s oil revenue to advance their population’s
needs systematically embezzle the remainder. Not constrained
by reliable institutional mechanisms of accountability and
transparency, and aided by the profound secrecy of the oil
industry,21 ruling elites, even in distributive dictatorships,
inevitably abuse the people’s oil revenue for private ends, on
a far-from-trivial scale. This charge applies, among others,
to Saudi Arabia, where complaints are now explicit that
members of the ruling clan treat the country’s vast oil riches
as “spoils” to be shared among themselves,22 and to Russia,
where strongman Vladimir Putin is believed to have amassed,
in large part out of embezzled oil revenues that belong to his
people, a personal fortune exceeding forty billion dollars
(Harding 2007, 2011).
I should emphasize that in making these points, I do not
mean to deny that the violations of national property rights,
and the negative duty to end the complicity of liberal de-
mocracies in these violations, are more urgent in depriving
dictatorships than in distributive dictatorships.23 But the
fact that violations of national property rights are especially
disturbing in the former case does not mean that the latter
is negligible.
Let us move then to the next objection. According to this
objection, my strategic argument is unreliable, because it can
only have force as long as resource-rich dictatorships do not
democratize. If they did, there would be no problem with
continuing to consume their oil, and so the argument would
produce no new grounds for developing green alternatives
to oil.
There are two related reasons why this objection fails.
First, it portrays the existence of dictatorships in oil-rich
countries as accidental (maybe even ephemeral). But this
portrayal is misleading, as the social science debate on the
“oil curse” shows. Despite various disagreements, both so-
cial scientists who believe that oil abundance causes polit-
ical and economic maladies, and their critics who insist thatduty to reform customary trade, partly because of problems of invalid consent
and partly because of reasons of integrity that liberal democracies have against
continued entanglement in dictators’ natural resource dealings. On these con-
siderations, see Nili (forthcoming a, forthcoming b).
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on the following key point: once a situation exists where a
dictatorship controls abundant oil reserves, there is a clear
danger of a vicious cycle, with the regime perpetuating its
hold on power, through its control of oil wealth, at the pop-
ulation’s expense, countered not by democratization, but by
civil wars or coups to capture the oil wealth (see, e.g., Ace-
moglu and Robinson 2012; Haber and Menaldo 2011; Mor-
rison 2009). This cycle means that as long as customary trade
continues, the prospects for democratization in many oil-rich
dictatorships are at best limited.
Second, prohibiting oil corporations from transacting with
petrocrats might itself be necessary for breaking this vicious
cycle—for depriving petrocrats of the oil wealth with which
they fund their rule and for taking away a key incentive for
coups and civil wars. But if this prohibition, in turn, realisti-
cally depends on the availability of green alternatives to oil
(assuming existing levels of energy demand), then the ob-
jection gets the sequence of events wrong. The sequence of
changes does not begin with petrocrats democratizing, thus
taking away the need to develop green alternatives to the oil
they control. Rather, the sequence begins with the develop-
ment of green alternatives that will make it possible to re-
form transactions with petrocrats, a reform that might itself
be a necessary condition for democratization.24
The final objection I wish to anticipate takes aim at a dif-
ferent part of my strategic argument. According to this ob-
jection, my argument hinges on a false setup of the relevant
choice situation facing affluent democracies (and the United
States in particular). Rather than developing green alternatives
to oil controlled by dictators, both democratic governments
and markets can instead turn to other alternatives to conven-
tional oil that will only increase environmental problems—
including the exploration of domestic oil deposits in environ-
mentally sensitive areas or additional governmental support24. Saying that prohibiting oil purchases from petrocrats might be a
necessary condition for their democratization is of course different from
saying that this would be a sufficient condition. And it is also different from
saying that the duty to enact such a prohibition is contingent on whether a
prohibition will trigger democratization. One can argue that Western oil
corporations ought to stop their complicity in Putin’s theft of the Russian
people’s oil wealth, for example, independently of whether such a stop will
facilitate democratization of the Russian regime. More generally, one could
argue that just as colonial powers had a duty to end colonial rule, inde-
pendently of the uncertainty as to how decolonization would affect their
victims, and just as liberal democracies had a moral duty to divest from
apartheid independently of the uncertainty as to divestment’s effects, so
there ought to be, at minimum, a very strong presumption in favor of di-
vestment when it comes to the (essentially neo-colonial) customary trade in
natural resources. For similar remarks see Nili (2013b, forthcoming a); see
also Marinov and Nili (forthcoming); and Nili (forthcoming c).
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shale gas and oil (also known as “tight oil”).
This objection ignores some significant issues. For one
thing, the objection assumes (however implicitly) that the
genuine availability of anti-green alternatives to conven-
tional oil is obvious and straightforward. But it is not. Many
scientists continue to dispute whether anti-green alterna-
tives such as tight oil have real potential to “do the work” that
conventional oil does now, in large part because of their
extremely low ratio of energy returned on energy invested
(EROI).25 Thus, for example, the editors of a December 2013
special issue on “The Future of Oil Supply,” published by the
physical sciences journal of the Philosophical Transactions of
the Royal Society, summarized the issue as providing “a so-
bering picture of the challenges ahead”:
Most authors accept that conventional oil resources
are at an advanced stage of depletion and that liquid
fuels will become more expensive and increasingly
scarce.The tight oil “revolution” has provided some short-
term relief, but seems unlikely to make a significant dif-
ference in the longer term. Even with a more sanguine
view of global supply prospects, the large scale, capital
intensity, long lead times and constrained potential of
the various mitigation options point to the need for a
coordinated response . . . there is a growing consensus
that the era of cheap oil has passed and that we are
entering a new and very different phase. (Miller and
Sorrell 2014, 2, 24; italics mine)
Alongside the basic scientific issue, there is also a deeper
problem with the objection, which requires more elabora-
tion. The objection in effect assumes that there needs to be
a special reason for the skeptic to prioritize green over “anti-
green” energy. But this is not the case. Since he concedes the
existence of environmental threats, and since green energy, by
definition, would mitigate these threats, the skeptic in fact
concedes that special reasons have to be given in order to pri-
oritize anti-green energy. The skeptic simply believes that he
can indeed offer such reasons, which outweigh the environ-
mental benefits of green energy. What we need to ask, then,
is what these reasons are, and whether they remain operative
once the implications of reforming oil trade are taken into
account. If they do not, then—as we will see—the skeptic
would have to prioritize the development of green energy
even when compared to all anti-green options.25. Even accounting for new technologies to recover tight oil, its EROI
stands at 1.5:1, vastly inferior to conventional oil, standing at 20:1. See
Cleveland and O’Connor (2011).
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voke to excuse continued reliance on anti-green energy—
and specifically on oil—under present circumstances. First,
a path-dependency claim: “Certainly,” the skeptic will ad-
mit, “green energy would have to be given priority if we were
designing our energy policies ex nihilo, with little or no costs
already invested in specific choices. However, our present
condition is different. Rather than designing energy policies
on a blank slate, our choices are already significantly affected
by the past choices that have structured economies, regula-
tion and infrastructure around oil. The sheer fact that oil has
been the dominant energy basis of industrialized nations
for almost a century means that a fundamental shift to any
other source of energy, simply in virtue of being a funda-
mental shift, would require massive resources and adjust-
ments from the private sector, from government, and from
ordinary citizens. Everyone will have to endure tremendous
set-up costs, extensive uncertainties, massive coordination is-
sues, and prolonged learning processes.”
Second, related, the skeptic will invoke a simple price claim:
“As long as serious environmental threats are not yet immi-
nent,” the skeptic will say, “there is not enough reason to un-
dertake such difficult shifts when the price of oil—notwith-
standing its volatility—generally remains low enough. To be
sure, at some point we will have to start shifting to other forms
of energy, simply because oil is finite. But that point is still quite
far. At least in the medium run, the fact that oil remains cheap
makes it sensible to accept the inertia of oil reliance. Until that
fact changes, we have more urgent problems to prioritize.”26
Now consider how these two claims would be affected if
democracies prohibited their corporations from purchasing
oil held by dictators, while seeking to retain the same level
of energy consumption. Start with the price claim. While the
appeal to the cheap price of oil may obtain in the existing en-
ergy market, it is very unlikely to obtain in a market in which
democracies prohibited their corporations from purchasing
dictators’ oil, but retained current energy demand. Given that,
as we have seen, democratic oil imports from dictators make
up a sizeable portion of global oil trade, if democratic import-
ers will be committed to stop buying oil from dictators
while keeping current levels of energy demand, this would
produce a dramatic—and, as opposed to what is currently
the case, enduring rise—in the price of “legitimate” oil.2726. Consider Bjørn Lomborg again: “When we are told that something
is a problem we need to ask how important it is in relation to other
problems. We are forced to constantly prioritize our resources, and there
will always be good projects we have to reject” (Lomborg 2001, 9).
27. Consider, for instance, how the removal of Saudi and Russian oil
alone would impact the price of Norwegian oil.
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dependency claim concerning the significant costs of energy
shifts. The reason is that once the cost of oil imports be-
comes prohibitive, such shifts would be necessary in any case.
Since the many affluent democracies that rely on foreign oil
imports would have to seriously curtail these imports, they will
have no choice but to make fundamental shifts in their en-
ergy base.28 Thus, fear of the multiple kinds of costs associ-
ated with shifts as such would become irrelevant.
By triggering a steep increase in oil prices, a democratic
prohibition on oil purchases from dictators therefore takes
away both of the skeptic’s excuses for not prioritizing the de-
velopment of green energy. Once the path-dependency and
the price consideration are no longer operative, the skeptic
cannot explain why the development of green energy should
not become a key priority, even when compared to anti-green
alternatives other than oil.
This claim can also be made in more specific form, as
follows. By necessitating a transformation of energy policy,
reform of customary oil trade turns on its head the skeptic’s
fear of the costs of energy policy shifts. Instead of justifying
avoidance of green energy development, the emphasis on the
costs of policy shifts becomes an argument for prioritizing
the development of green energy. The reason is this. If policy
makers are compelled to undertake an energy policy shift, and
if they are sensitive to the aforementioned costs associated
with any shift, they are likely to prioritize those present tran-
sitions that would avoid or reduce the need for additional
transitions in the future. Since green energy, by definition, does
not entail long-term threats that would necessitate additional
changes later on, it has a crucial advantage over anti-green
forms of energy that would eventually necessitate such changes,
simply because of the long-term dangers that they entail.
To these arguments regarding the impact of exogenous
shocks on anti-green energy inertia, one can add three briefer
points. First, agitation over projects that deepen anti-green
energy inertia—from intense debates over the US-Canada
pipeline to ongoing disputes over fracking—is evidence of
already-existing widespread suspicion of further steps down
anti-environmental routes. But to take such steps as a com-
mitted national policy—to actively (re)choose the path of
anti-environmental energy, as distinct from merely follow-
ing the same path out of inertia—could very well trigger pub-
lic disapproval of a much deeper sort. Indeed, public opinion
research shows that even among those segments who see the28. Thus, for example, according to the US Energy Information Ad-
ministration, in 2012, “about 57% of the crude oil processed in US refiner-
ies was imported.” See “How Dependent Is the United States on Foreign
Oil?,” http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?idp32&tp6.
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basic recognition of environmental problems and willingness
to support at least some public policies that will address those
problems (Smith and Leiserowitz 2013), including support for
long-term increase in the use of green energy, support for long-
term decrease in the use of fossil fuels, and opposition to sub-
sidization of fossil-fuel industries.29 A massive spur in the de-
velopment of anti-green energy, however, would go in exactly
the opposite direction.
A second, and very much related, point, concerns oil mar-
ket dynamics. If one is inclined to think that anti-green energy
can replace the oil that democracies import from dictatorships,
this is probably because one believes that the oil market will
itself “solve the problem,” as alternatives to conventional oil
become more easily available with time. But this belief is con-
founded not only by the scientific issues flagged above. It is
also confounded by the fact that the oil market is actually
more complicated. There are actors who have a great deal
to lose from the rise of nonconventional oil—most impor-
tantly, the dictatorships that depend on conventional oil ex-
ports. These dictatorships are likely to do anything in their
power to strangle the nonconventional oil industry in the
cradle, most immediately, by letting the oil price fall—as Saudi
Arabia has—in order to push many producers of noncon-
ventional oil out of business.30 This point suggests that in order
to protect the nascent nonconventional oil industry from ex-
ternal pressure, democratic governments, including the US
government, might very well have to provide extensive subsi-
dies to these industries over an extensive period of time.31 Such
subsidies, however, will not only conflict with the policy pref-
erences of a significant portion of the American public (as
I just noted) and, more generally, conflict with public suspi-
cion of a policy recommitting to anti-green energy. Even
more fundamentally, such subsidies trigger a basic ques-
tion: if the effort to develop alternatives to oil controlled by29. In this context, the Six Americas project is once again instructive.
The project’s September 2012 survey found that “majorities of all Six
Americas say the United States should increase its use of renewable en-
ergy”; that “In five of the six segments, larger proportions prefer to reduce,
rather than increase fossil fuel use”; and that “in every segment except the
Dismissive, half or more favor the elimination of subsidies to the fossil fuel
industry, and oppose the elimination of subsidies to renewable energy
companies.” See Leiserowitz et al. (2013, 2).
30. See “Sheikhs v Shale,” Economist, December 6, 2014, http://www.econo
mist.com/news/leaders/21635472-economics-oil-have-changed-some-businesses
-will-go-bust-market-will-be.
31. This is particularly the case given that Saudi Arabia has savings of
$900 billion, and so, as Economist also emphasizes, “can afford self-denial”
over a substantial period of time. See “Making theBest of a LowPrice:What Is the
Oil Cartel Up To?,” Economist, December 6, 2014, http://www.economist.com
/news/finance-and-economics/21635510-what-oil-cartel-up-making-best-low-price.
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case, why not direct this effort toward the path that has the
best prospects of long-term sustainability?
The final point I wish to make is again related. Public re-
luctance about a dramatic buildup of anti-green energy might
be particularly intense given that such buildup will require
internalizing much of the environmental cost of anti-green
energy that affluent democracies have so far managed to
“send” elsewhere. Affluent countries have frequently been
trying (self-deceivingly?) to keep environmental threats at a
distance by, for instance, sending their nuclear waste to be
buried in the global south. A prohibition on purchasing oil
from dictators will, quite literally, bring home the environ-
mental costs of anti-green energy. If much more of this en-
ergy would have to be produced domestically, this would—
among other things—greatly increase the risk to air and
water quality in democratic countries, as well as the risk of
environmental disasters such as the Exxon Valdez or the BP
oil spill recurring in affluent democracies rather than in
“distant” poor countries. Such increased and highly visible
risks are unlikely to be ignored by the general public and by
governments accountable to the public. Therefore, the more
affluent democracies need to sacrifice their own environment
for economic goals rather than the environment of the poor,
the more likely they are to avoid anti-environmental policies.
This is perhaps one reason why even President George W.
Bush, for example, who led a highly anti-environmentalist
administration, declared that oil from foreign authoritarians
has to be replaced not with more domestic oil but rather
with green energy—exclaiming in his 2006 State of the Union
Address that “America is addicted to oil, which is often
imported from unstable parts of the world. The best way to
break this addiction is through technology . . . cleaner, cheaper,
and more reliable alternative energy sources.”32
CONCLUSION
My aim in this article was to construct a strategic argument
for green energy that, being focused on negative duties to
respect the property rights of present people(s) over their oil,
can appeal, especially in the American context, even to those
who are skeptical of climate change. I wish to reiterate that
this strategic argument is meant to supplement, rather than
replace, familiar environmentalist arguments for green pol-
icies. Nothing in what I have said here is meant to suggest
that environmentalists should forsake their principled op-
position to many (normative and empirical) claims made by
environmental skeptics. My argument is intended as an ad-32. See the 2006 US State of the Union transcript, available at http://
www.cbsnews.com/2100-250_162-1264706.html.
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